> The first case is straight forward (to me :-) kill the one, save the six.
That is the way it seems to me, too.
> The second case is a bit more morally difficult.
Yeppers.
> I disagree with the future, "god" situation that says the others would die.
If you alter the case then the solution is easy/easier. In this case I need to ask you to grant that the case is as described. That it is known that the organ operations would indeed be successful if performed, and that it is known that the people who need the organ operations will die (very soon) if the organs aren't harvested from this particular one person.
If you accept the case as is...
Would that still be your answer?
(Some people do argue that a problem with the latter case is that it is implausible. Who cares about what people have to say about IMPLAUSIBLE cases when ethics / morality is meant to be about what we should do in cases we plausibly find ourselves in? This is a tempting line... I wonder if it would be possible to come up with an analogous case that was more plausible, however. We could do it with probabilities of survival vs death in both of the above cases)
> I would not be able to "harvest" organs by allowing someone to die whom I could have saved straight out; that would be my omelas situation.
But then... Diverting the train is killing a person, too...
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